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Stimulating the Economy in an  
Era of Debt and Deficit
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
A
ny diagnosis of the current eco-
nomic situation should focus on 
the fact that the shortfall between 
actual and potential unemploy-
ment is huge and that monetary 
policy has proven ineffective, at least in restor-
ing the economy to anything near full employ-
ment. 
Under these circumstances, the traditional 
economists’ solution has been to advocate the 
use of fiscal policy—tax cuts and/or spending 
increases. There is an especially compelling case 
for increasing public investments because they 
would increase GDP and employment today 
as well as increase output in the future. Given 
low interest rates, the enhanced growth in GDP 
would more than offset the increased cost of 
government spending, reducing national debt 
in the medium term. Moreover, the ratio of debt 
to GDP would decrease and the ability of the 
U.S. economy to sustain debt (debt sustainabil-
ity) would improve. 
This happy state of affairs is especially likely 
given the ample supply of high-return invest-
ment opportunities in infrastructure, technol-
ogy, and education resulting from underinvest-
ment in these areas over the past quarter centu-
ry. Moreover, well-designed public investments 
would raise the return on private investments, 
“crowding in” this additional source of spend-
ing. Together, increased public and private in-
vestment would raise output and employment 
in the short run, and increase growth and debt 
sustainability in the medium and long run. Such 
spending would reduce (not increase) the ratio 
of debt to GDP. Thus, the objection that the U.S. 
should not engage in such fiscal policies because 
of the high ratio of debt to GDP is simply wrong; 
even those who suffer from deficit fetishism 
should support such measures.
Critics of this standard Keynesian prescrip-
tion raise two objections: (a) government is not 
likely to spend the money on high return in-
vestments, so that the promised gains will prove 
elusive and (b) the fiscal multipliers are small 
(perhaps negative), suggesting that the short-
run gains from fiscal policy are minimal at best. 
Both of these objections are easily dismissed in 
the current economic environment.
First, the assertion that government is inca-
pable of making high return investments is just 
wrong. Studies of the average returns on gov-
ernment spending on investments in technology 
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show extraordinarily high returns, with returns 
on investments in infrastructure and education 
returns well above the cost of borrowing. Thus, 
from a national point of view, investments in 
these areas make sense, even if the government 
fails to make the investments with the absolute 
highest returns. 
Second, the many variants of the argument 
that the fiscal multiplier is small typically rest 
on the assumption that as government spending 
increases, some category of private expenditure 
will decline to offset this increase. 1 Certainly, 
when the economy is at full employment and 
capital is being fully utilized, GDP cannot in-
crease. Hence, under the circumstances, the 
multiplier must be zero. But today’s economic 
conditions of significant and persistent resource 
underutilization have not been experienced 
since the Great Depression. As a result, it is sim-
ply meaningless to rely on empirical estimates 
of multipliers based on post-World War II data. 
Contractionary monetary policy is another rea-
son why multipliers may be markedly larger 
now than they were in some earlier situations of 
excess capacity. In these cases, monetary author-
ities, excessively fearful of inflation, responded 
to deficit spending by raising interest rates and 
constraining credit availability, thus dampening 
private spending. But such an outcome is not 
inevitable; it is a result of policies, often guided 
by mistaken economic theories. 
In any case, such an outcome is irrelevant 
today. This is because the Federal Reserve is 
committed to an unprecedented policy of main-
taining near-zero interest rates through at least 
the end of 2014, while at the same time encour-
aging government spending. With interest rates 
at record lows and the Federal Reserve commit-
ted to keeping them there, crowding out of pri-
vate investment simply will not occur. On the 
contrary, as I have noted, public investment—
for instance, in better infrastructure—is more 
likely to increase the returns to private invest-
ment. Such public spending crowds in private 
investment, increasing the multiplier.
Sometimes economists claim that consum-
ers, worried about future tax liabilities in the 
wake of government spending, would contract 
their spending. However, the applicability of 
this notion (referred to as Ricardian equiva-
lence) is contradicted by the fact that when 
George W. Bush lowered taxes and massively 
increased the deficit, savings plummeted to 
zero. But even if one believed in the applicabil-
ity of Ricardian equivalence in today’s economy, 
government spending on investments that in-
crease future growth and improve the debt-to-
GDP ratio would induce rational to spend more 
today. Consumption would also be crowded in 
by such government expenditures, not crowd-
ed out. 
Indeed, if consumers had rational expecta-
tions, the multiplier would increase even more 
in a long-lived downturn like the current one. 
The reason is that some of the money that is 
saved this year will be spent next year, or the 
year after, or the year after that—periods in 
which the economy is still well-below capacity. 
This increased spending will lead to higher em-
ployment and incomes in these later years. But 
if individuals are rational, the realization that 
their future incomes will be higher will lead 
them to spend more today. Deficit spending to-
day crowds in not just investment, but also con-
sumption. 
Thus, a careful look at the current situa-
tion suggests that the impact of well-designed 
government programs will be to stimulate the 
economy more than is assumed to be the case in 
standard Keynesian models (which typically as-
sume a short-lived downturn and yield a short 
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run fiscal multiplier of around 1.5). Even in the 
current period, fiscal policy results in greater 
output increases because investment and con-
sumption is crowded in, because: (a) the Fed-
eral Reserve is unlikely either to increase inter-
est rates or reduce credit availability; (b) public 
investments are likely to increase the returns to 
private investments; and (c) rational consumers/
taxpayers may recognize that future tax liabili-
ties will decline and that future incomes will rise 
as a result of these measures. 
By the same token, in a long-lived reces-
sion such as this, forward-looking expectations 
provide an important cautionary note against 
popular deficit reduction packages that are 
“back loaded,” with expenditure cuts that are 
slated to occur even two or three years down 
the line. If consumers are not confident that the 
economy will be healthy again at the end of that 
period, they will view such expenditure cuts as 
weakening the economy in the future. Consum-
ers will thus be induced to save now to protect 
themselves against future economic contraction. 
Future social security cuts will similarly induce 
consumers to save more now, to ensure that they 
have funds for their retirement. Moreover, in-
vestors, anticipating a reduction in GDP in fu-
ture years, may cut back investments now. In 
short, in a world of rational expectations, even 
expenditure cuts slated for the future can have 
contractionary effects today.
welfare improving policies that improve 
debt sustainability
In the run-up to the current economic crisis, financial markets demonstrated an extraor-
dinarily short-term perspective. The single 
minded focus on today’s deficit, regardless of 
how the money is spent, is another manifes-
tation of this short-sightedness. Government 
should take a longer-term perspective.
However, even if one focuses on debt sus-
tainability, taking as given the constraint that 
government cannot increase its deficit in the 
short run, there are still policies that can stim-
ulate the economy, increase our future growth 
potential, and improve our long-term—or even 
current—deficit position. In the standard eco-
nomic model, the ratio of GDP to increased gov-
ernment spending produced by the “balanced 
budget multiplier” was unity. But if government 
raises revenues by taxing upper-income indi-
viduals who have high savings rates, and uses 
the funds for investments (or even unemploy-
ment insurance), the balanced budget multi-
plier is much larger, by a factor of two or more. 
Converting saving to spending – at a time when 
the private return to investment appears to be 
so low and the public return to investment is so 
high – will be particularly productive.
The policy that I have just described both 
avoids an increase in today’s deficit and im-
proves debt sustainability over time because it 
leads to both an increase in GDP and a reduc-
tion in medium- to long-term national debt. The 
extra revenue generated by the increased growth 
and the reduced need for social expenditures to 
offset the effects of the downturn produce lower 
fiscal deficits. 
This positive outcome is explained by the 
fact that different kinds of taxes and expendi-
tures produce different multipliers. The typical 
short-run Keynesian multiplier of 1.5 discussed 
above is an average multiplier, which reflects 
the effect of increased government spending 
on consumers’ marginal propensity to spend 
at all levels of the income distribution. How-
ever, the marginal propensity to consume out of 
unemployment benefits is very high; the mar-
ginal propensity to consume by the very rich is 
much, much lower. The result is that an extra 
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dollar spent on unemployment insurance stim-
ulates the economy a lot; an extra dollar “spent” 
on tax reductions for the rich reduces GDP by 
a much smaller amount. By pairing high mul-
tiplier expenditures with low multiplier tax in-
creases, one can increase the balanced budget 
multiplier. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that spending 
on unemployment insurance benefits, while 
potentially not as productive as spending on 
infrastructure investment, provides other ben-
efits as well. For example, it is often argued 
that unemployment insurance discourages the 
search for employment, and thus introduces a 
market distortion. But just as multipliers dif-
fer in periods of high vs. low unemployment, 
so do the economic consequences of increased 
unemployment insurance. When there are only 
a limited number of jobs (right now, there are 
four job seekers for every job; at the worst 
point in the recession, there were seven),2 more 
search only increases the length of job queues. 
If higher unemployment benefits in a deep re-
cession reduce wasteful search, with those who 
value a job least dropping out of the competi-
tion for the limited number of positions, then 
societal welfare is also improved. 
deficit reduction—or a wolf’s agenda in 
sheep’s clothing?
In any case, the balanced budget multiplier is but one example of welfare enhancing poli-
cies that maintain or even improve debt sus-
tainability. For example, eliminating corporate 
welfare for coal, oil, and ethanol will eliminate 
a major distortion in the economy, improve the 
environment, and raise revenues. Similar ben-
efits could be reaped by focusing on the “sale” 
of the country’s national resources to corpo-
rations at prices below fair market value, and 
the procurement by Government of goods and 
services at prices above fair market value. The 
spectrum auctions showed how well-designed 
auctions could raise significant income for the 
Treasury, but we still have not applied the les-
sons to sales of most of the country’s natural 
resources, some of which are almost given 
away. Likewise, while many deficit reduction 
proposals recognize that something should be 
done about corporate welfare—i.e., the large 
subsidies given to a variety of America’s corpo-
rations, often hidden in special tax provisions-
-most of these proposals underestimate the 
pervasiveness of tax benefits for corporations, 
and their budgetary and economic costs. 
That the deficit hawks ignore these realities 
suggests that they have another agenda: down-
sizing government and increasing the regressiv-
ity of our tax and expenditure system.3 If deficit 
reduction were really their objective, they would 
be focusing on the four developments that re-
versed the Clinton surpluses and mired us in the 
current situation. First, there were two large tax 
cuts that the country could ill afford. Second, 
there were two massively expensive wars, accom-
panied by unbridled increases in non-war-relat-
ed defense expenditures—to the point that the 
U.S. accounts for around 50 percent of all global 
military expenditures. Third, Congress passed a 
much-needed prescription drug benefit under 
Medicare, but did it in a way that subsidized the 
drug industry, restricting the government’s abil-
ity to bargain over drug prices. And fourth, there 
was the Great Recession, which eroded revenues 
and increased expenditures on unemployment 
and other social protection programs. 
Ending the tax cuts, the wars, the gift to the 
drug companies—and most important, restor-
ing the economy to its potential GDP—would 
go a long way to reversing our fiscal fortunes. 
These simple prescriptions were not, how-
ever, at the center of the Bowles–Simpson Com-
Brought to you by | Columbia University Library The Burke Library New York
Authenticated | 128.59.160.233
Download Date | 3/25/13 8:22 PM
-5-
The Economists’ Voice http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ev March, 2012
mission’s recommendations.4 Instead, Bowles–
Simpson advocated austerity, at a time well 
before even the Federal Reserve thought the 
economy would be restored to full employment. 
Such austerity would almost certainly lower 
GDP and tax revenues. Indeed, it is curious that 
tax reductions would play any role in the rec-
ommendations of a Committee charged with 
improving the country’s fiscal position (unless 
one believed in the discredited Reagan-era sup-
ply-side theories that played such a large role in 
getting the country into its current fiscal mess). 
The Committee also failed to adhere to the 
principle of protecting the beleaguered middle 
class, whose income has decreased to levels be-
low those of more than a decade ago. Growth 
in recent years has benefitted only the very top 
earners, who now take home a very large share 
of the nation’s income. Because of this uneven 
income distribution, the imposition of modest 
tax increases on these top earners— particularly 
those with high unearned income—can raise 
large revenues. Yet the Committee’s proposed re-
forms would have increased the effective tax rate 
on the middle class, thereby further weakening 
the real estate market (which was, of course, a 
precipitating factor in the economic crisis). 
Policymakers’ narrow focus on deficit reduc-
tion and debt sustainability has been misplaced. 
Our regressive and distortionary tax structure 
has received too little consideration, and when 
tax distortions do receive attention, too little 
thought is given to the distributive consequenc-
es of eliminating the middle class benefits and to 
the distortions associated with those that benefit 
the top. There is a broad sense across the coun-
try that the economic system—including our 
tax system—is unfair. In even more pragmatic 
terms, it makes no economic sense to tax those 
who work for a living at a higher rate than those 
who make a living from speculating. A fair tax 
system—taxing dividends and capital gains at 
the same rate as ordinary income—would both 
generate income and reduce a major distortion 
in the tax code. 
concluding comments
The first priority of the country should be a return to full employment. The underem-
ployment of labor is a massive waste and, more 
than anything else, jeopardizes our country’s 
future, as the skills of our young get wasted 
and alienation grows. As the work of Jayadev5 
as well as the IMF6 convincingly shows, aus-
terity in America will almost surely weaken 
growth. Moreover, as the work of Ferguson 
and Johnson7 shows, we should view with 
suspicion the claim (e.g. by Rogoff and Rein-
hardt) that exceeding a certain a debt-to-GDP 
ratio will trigger a crash. Even if this notion 
were true on average, the U.S. is not an average 
country. It is a reserve currency country, with 
markets responding to global instability—even 
when caused by the U.S.—by lowering interest 
rates. The U.S. has managed even bigger defi-
cits. Unlike the countries of Europe, there is no 
risk that we will not pay what we owe. To put 
it bluntly, we promise to repay dollars, and we 
control the printing presses. 
But a focus on the ratio of debt-to-GDP 
is simply economic nonsense. No one would 
judge a firm by looking at its debt alone. Any-
one claiming economic expertise would want 
to look at the balance sheet—assets as well as 
liabilities. Borrowing to invest is different from 
borrowing for consumption. The failure of the 
deficit hawks to realize this is consistent with 
my earlier conclusion that this debate is not 
about the size of the deficit, but about the size 
of the government and the progressivity of the 
tax system. 
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Letters commenting on this piece or others may 
be submitted at http://www.degruyter.com/
view/j/ev?tab=services
notes
1. The fiscal multiplier effect refers to the fact that when 
the government spends money, the newly spent mon-
ey recirculates, increases GDP over and over again, 
except for leakages—money that flows out of the sys-
tem to government or to foreigners. Typically, claims 
that the fiscal policy multiplier is small are based on 
the assumption that private expenditure will decline, 
rather than large leakages out of the system. 
2. ibid
3. My hypothesis that the deficit hawks have an al-
ternative agenda is also consistent with their as-
tounding advocacy of policies that mix tax cuts 
with matching expenditure reductions, while fail-
ing to acknowledge that such policies generate a 
negative balanced budget multiplier. Such propos-
als are even more damaging when there is a re-
duction in progressivity of the tax and expenditure 
system. 
4. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibil-
ity and Reform (often called Bowles––Simpson/
Simpson–Bowles from the names of co-chairs Alan 
Simpson and Erskine Bowles; or NCFRR) is a Presi-
dential Commission created in 2010 by President 
Barack Obama to identify policies to improve the 
fiscal situation in the medium term and to achieve 




5. Arjun Jayadev, forthcoming, “Distribution and Cri-
sis: Reviewing some of the Linkages,” Handbook on 
the Political Economy of Crisis,” G. Epstein and M. 
Wolfson, editors.
6. Andrew G. Berg and Jonathan D. Ostry (2011) 
“Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides 
of the Same Coin?” IMF Staff Discussion Note, 
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